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Abstract 
By its very nature, seafaring is a highly mobile occupation as it entails sailing across seas and 
oceans. Furthermore, the globalization of the shipping industry has made it commonplace that 
seafarers work on ships flying foreign flags and owned and managed by foreign shipping 
companies. It leads to a global seafarer labour market and seafarers become transnational 
workers. Accompanying this, however, is the rise of precarious employment – seafarers are 
likely to be employed on voyage contracts.  In a sense, seafarers’ employment is becoming 
mobile. This chapter discusses some issues related to various forms of seafarers’ mobility.  
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses issues of mobility related to seafarers. Seafarers are mobile primarily 
because of their workplace – ships, which transport cargo from one port to another across seas 
and oceans. Their mobility is further enhanced by the fact that rather than confined to the 
national fleet, many seafarers work on ships flying foreign flags and owned and managed by 
foreign shipping companies. This enhanced mobility is related to the practice commonly known 
as flagging-out in the shipping industry, which allows ship owners/managers to register their 
ships in Flag of Convenience (FOC) countries, such as Liberia and Panama, and to employ 
seafarers from any labour supply countries without restrictions and on short-term contracts. As 
such, this enhanced mobility results in widespread temporary employment in shipping. When 
seafarers are hired on a short-term basis, their employment becomes precarious, and they may 
have to move frequently to the next contract, maybe with a different employer. This can be 
understood as employment mobility. In the first two sections, drawing up existing literature we 
discuss the first two types of mobility and the negative effects on seafarers. The remaining 
parts discuss some consequences of employment mobility through examining the social 
security coverage of Chinese seafarers.   
 
Mobile workplace 
As merchant ships sail at sea, seafarers have to be away from home as well as from land for a 
period of time, which results in intermittent separation from their families. The separation 
period can be between a few weeks to more than a year, depending on many factors, such as 
types of ships, and seafarers’ rank and nationality.  
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Working at sea means seafarers are confined to their ships and suffering from social isolation 
(Sampson and Thomas 2002). Furthermore, shipboard working environment is full of hazards, 
such as noise, vibration, ship movement, heavy machinery, steel structure, and long working 
hours; when things get wrong in the middle of vast oceans, such as bad weather, illness, and 
engine failure, it is difficult to get help from the outside world and seafarers have to rely on 
themselves. Unsurprisingly, the safety record of the shipping industry has been a concern of 
the stakeholders (Bloor et al. 2000). For example, Danish research suggested that Danish fleet 
seafarers were about six times more likely to die from occupational accidents compared with 
Danish workers ashore in modern days (Hansen 1996; Borch et al. 2012).   
 
Being confined to ships and cut off from the rest of the world, seafarers have limited means to 
communicate with their families ashore, and are unable to participate in family activities (Tang 
2007). Consequently, they are likely to miss many important family and social events, for 
example, children growing up, and celebrations of birthdays and festivals. This exacerbates the 
sense of social isolation on ships.  
 
More importantly, working at sea and intermittent separation poses problems for intimate and 
personal relationships. According to Baumeister and Leary (1995), intimate relationships entail 
both physical proximity, as well as frequent and pleasant interactions in a continuous and 
shared temporal framework. Sharing time together is believed to be good for relationships, and 
in fact the most enjoyable time for couples has been reported to be leisure time spent together 
(Sullivan, 1996). For seafarers and their spouses, intermittent separation makes longing for 
each other’s company a painful but frequent experience (Tang 2012). Furthermore, seafarers’ 
intermittent absence also means that they are not able to spend time with their friends, which 
makes it difficult for them to sustain friendships at home (Thomas 2003). As a consequence, 
seafarers often feel socially isolated when they are home.  
 
From the perspective of seafarers’ spouses, apart from longing for their beloved ones, they also 
suffer from a series of problems related to seafarers’ absence. They have to manage everything 
at home without support from their spouses. Also due to separation, seafarers’ spouses feel that 
they live different lifestyles and have different experiences from other women whose partners 
work ashore. As a consequently, they tend to separate themselves from others and felt that non-
seafaring people could not fully appreciate and understand their situation, which in turn leads 
to socially isolation (Tang 2007; Thomas 2003).   
 
Due to these problems, seafaring is not regarded as an attractive vocation. People from 
developed countries are reluctant to find a career at sea and ship managers there have to look 
elsewhere for alternatives (Grey 1991; Wallis 2009). In fact, the number of seafarers from 
OECD countries has reduced dramatically since the 1970s. This reduction is also related to 
flagging out and the rise of the global seafarer labour market, to which we turn next.  
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Mobile capital 
The second type of mobility is related to flagging out. Until around the late 1960s, the majority 
of ship-owners registered their ships in home countries and employed domestic seafarers. As 
much of the maritime business was operated and owned by ship-owners from the advanced 
economies, such as the UK, Japan and Norway, these States were widely known as the 
Traditional Maritime Nations (TMN) which generally imposed high standards for admitting 
ships in their registries and maintained stringent regulatory practices (Alderton and Winchester, 
2002). However, from the mid-1960s, flagging out started to gain momentum, as the transfer 
of assets to a FOC provided several benefits for ship-owners. First, the regulatory framework 
of FOCs offered ship-owners a set of relaxed regulatory requirements, thus lowering labour, 
safety and environment standards in the industry. Second, it brought about a competitive cost 
advantage, such as low registration fees and tonnage tax (DeSombre, 2006). Furthermore, 
FOCs did not impose any restriction on the nationality of seafarers, the ship-owners 
increasingly began to employ low-wage seafarers from new labour-supply nations, such as 
from the East European, East and South East Asian countries. This enabled consolidation of 
economic advantage by engaging in increased cross-border activity and exploitation of various 
resources. It also gives rise to a global seafarer labour market (Alderton et al. 2004; ILO 2001).  
 
The global labour market leads to enhanced mobility of seafarers. Needless to say, this 
enhanced mobility is driven by the mobility of shipping capital which aims to cut cost and 
maximise profit. As such, while mobile shipping capital brings much needed job opportunities 
to newly emerging seafarer supply countries, it also has negative impacts on the working and 
employment conditions in the industry. To save running costs, ship owners/managers 
increasingly employ cheaper seafarers from new labour-supply nations on short-term contracts, 
which serves to end the practice of permanent employment. Research evidence shows that the 
‘majority of seafarers worked on contracts covering a single voyage or tour of duty’ which was 
typically between five and 12 months but some were for longer, and employers thus have no 
obligation towards the seafarers’ future employability (ILO 2001: 64; see also Kahveci and 
Nichols 2006).  
 
Accompanying the structural change of the industry is technological advancement (ILO 2001). 
Ship operations have become more automated, which led to significant reductions in crew size. 
Adoption of new technology, however, is not necessarily globally synchronised. Morris and 
Donn (1997) examined the relationship between new technology and industrial relations in 
United States and Australian shipping. They found that strong resistance from maritime unions 
coupled with public policies protecting and subsidising national fleets made fleet 
modernisation in the two countries about 15 to 20 years lagging behind other OECD countries. 
This finding suggests that when they were strong, national maritime unions played an important 
role in protecting seafarers’ jobs. However, Morris and Donn also noted that as US and 
Australian governments leaned towards neoliberalism economic policies in the 1980s, 
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maritime trade unions could no longer resist technological changes in shipping. Furthermore, 
the rise of FOCs has dwindled national fleets of OECD countries significantly, which also 
weakens the influence of national unions. As such, the average crew size of Australian 
merchant navy fleet was reduced from 35 in 1982 to 16 in 1994 (Morris and Donn 1997).  
 
Technological innovations have also made ships sail faster and greatly reduced port turnaround 
time (Kahveci 1999). In one typical port, the data suggested that vessel berth time on average 
was cut from 138.50 hours in 1970 to about 15.75 in 1998 (Kahveci 1999). Even though 
technology makes some ship operations less demanding, it can hardly replace manpower in 
berthing and un-berthing operations. Reduction in crew size and turnaround time means that 
there are fewer people but less time to do the same amount of work, which inevitably results 
in work intensification (IMO 2001; Kahveci 1999). Thus, it is not surprising that fatigue has 
been a serious concern in the industry for many years and subject to extensive research and 
discussion (Smith 2007).  
 
The above discussion does not imply that protecting seafarers’ rights and improving working 
and employment conditions have been overlooked. The International Transport Workers’ 
Federation (ITF) provides union support to the seafarers at the global level, and it has been 
working at the trans-national level successfully, bargaining for seafarers’ wages by negotiating 
with seafaring unions in traditional maritime nations and in new labour supply nations (Lille 
2005). In 2006, the International Labour Organization adopted the Maritime Labour 
Convention (MLC) to protect seafarers and promote decent work in this sector. It imposes 
regulatory requirements on issues related to working and living conditions on ships, 
employment conditions, and welfare and social security. In 2013, the Convention came into 
force globally. The effect of MLC enforcement on labour standards, however, remains to be 
seen.  
 
As mentioned, the global seafaring labour market is characterized by precarious employment, 
which can be regarded as employment mobility. Research in land-based industries indicates 
that employers in general do not buy social insurance for temporary and contracted labour 
(Smith 2005). This question arising here is what problems employment mobility might pose 
on the MLC implementation.  In remaining sections of this article, we address this question 
using the case of Chinese seafarers as an example.  
 
Mobile employment 
The case of Chinese seafarers 
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China is a major seafaring labour supply country and at the same time controls a large national 
fleet. According to the most recent BIMCO Manpower Report (2015), China has become the 
top seafarer labour supply country with 243,635 seafarers, followed by the Philippines with 
215,000 seafarers. Other major seafarer supply countries are Indonesia (143,702), Russia 
(87,061), India (86,084) and Ukraine (69,000). However, according to Chinese official 
statistics (MSA 2016), in 2015, a total number of 638,990 Chinese held valid seafarer 
certificates3, and 133,326 of them worked on foreign ships. The majority of Chinese seafarers 
are still from relatively richer coastal provinces, such as Shandong, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, 
and Guangdong, though some inland provinces, such as Hubei and Henan, also produce a large 
number of seafarers (MSA 2016).   
 
Over the last three and half decades or so, the employment of seafarers has undergone 
significant transformations in China. First, Chinese seafarers started to work on foreign ships 
in 1979, and the following decades witnessed a growing number of them deployed overseas. 
Second, the transition from a planned economy to a market one which started in the early 1980s 
opened the market for private shipping companies and crewing agencies to crop up and grow. 
As a result, employment of seafarers has been diversified. Third, when the employment market 
was monopolized by state- or local government-owned shipping companies, Chinese seafarers 
were employed for life and their welfare was looked after by their employers. With the 
deepening of the market reform, seafarers’ employment was gradually changed to contract 
based. Thus, in the 1990s, seafarers working at state- or local government-owned shipping 
companies had permanent or long-term contracts, while those working for private ship owners 
and crewing agencies were likely to have short-term contracts, 3-5 years, for example. At the 
same time, a group of ‘freelance’ seafarers also appeared in the labour market who secure 
employment through crewing agencies on contracts covering a tour of duty only. Therefore, 
the employment of Chinese seafarers is no longer universally fixed for life to state owned 
companies, and a range of employment practices co-exist and compete with each other today. 
Needless to say, seafarers are more mobile when their contract length is shorter as they are 
more likely to change employers frequently.  
 
Research evidence in the early 2000s suggested that working on foreign ships was much more 
attractive than on the national fleet as the former offered higher salary and more job 
opportunities (Wu 2004). Consequently, many seafarers employed by state-owned shipping 
companies wanted to break free from their employers in order to work for crewing agencies. 
This resulted in a rapid increase in the number of freelance seafarers who worked for crewing 
agencies on tour-of-duty contracts (Wu, Lai, & Cheng 2006). State-owned shipping companies, 
however, did not want to lose their workforce. To retain seafarers, they were reported to control 
their seafarers’ certificates (Wu, Lai, & Cheng 2006; Zhao 2011): when seafarers are on leave, 
their company would collect their certificates to make sure that they would not be able to work 
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for other companies. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Chinese seafarers increasingly choose 
to be highly mobile for better pay and job opportunities.   
 
It is also important to note that the changes related to seafarers’ employment take place in the 
bigger context of the transformation of employment relations in China. Until the early 1990s, 
workers were in general employed permanently without contracts. In 1996, the Labour Law 
came into force, which introduced a labour contract system. The main purpose of this contract 
system was to ‘smash the iron rice bowl’, which referred to life-long employment. Gradually, 
permanent employment is replace with one that is contract-based, even though some contracts 
are open-ended.  
 
In 2008, China’s new Labour Contract Law (LCL) came into effect, providing more 
protections for labour. It requires all workers to have a written contract, and stipulates that an 
open-term labour contract is deemed in effect if an employee has successfully concluded two 
consecutive fixed-term contracts or has worked for the employer for one year without a written 
contract. It also requires employers to contribute to their employees’ social insurance, and 
social insurance should be included in the employee’s labour contract. There are five types of 
social insurance, all of which are predominantly provided through employers: pensions, 
medical, unemployment, work injury, and maternity insurances. Both employers and 
employees are required to make financial contributions to the social insurance programs. 
Another important employment-based benefit, the housing provident fund, was established in 
1994 to help employees establish personal housing fund accounts and increase housing 
affordability as housing became privatized and housing prices rose drastically. The 
administration and financing of the housing provident fund are similar to those for the social 
insurance programs, with both employers and employees making regular payments.  
 
According to this LCL, seafarers should have contracts and their employers should make 
contributions to their social insurance. As such, in terms of welfare and social security, the 
LCL arrangement would satisfy the requirements of MLC 2006. In this context, an examination 
of the LCL implementation in relation to Chinese seafarers will shed light on the 
implementation of MLC, and problems associated with the LCL implementation are likely to 
be encountered by MLC implementation as they are similar in terms of requirements on 
employment conditions.    
 
In relation to this issue, a study of Chinese seafarers’ rights and protection was conducted in 
2014. A total number of 37 shipping and crewing companies from five provinces, Fujian, Hubei, 
Guangdong, Liaoning and Henan, participated in the study, and the managers were interviewed 
between June and October of 2014.  The next section reports some findings from these 
interviews. It is worth noting here that these accounts are from managers’ perspective.  
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Social insurance and mobility 
To make sense of issues related to seafarers’ social security, it is necessary to explain the 
common seafarer employment practices in China. This is because the data suggests that 
seafarers’ social insurance coverage is closely linked to their employment status.  
 
The separation between operation management and crew management is commonplace in 
shipping. Ship managers crew their ships through either in-house crew management 
departments or third-party crewing agencies. This practice results in a supply chain of crewing 
service. The companies participated in this study represent an entire chain. On top of the chain 
are shipping companies whose ships are manned through either in-house crew management 
arms or third-party crewing agencies or a combination or both. Apart from manning their own 
fleet, many of the in-house crew management arms also provide crewing service to third-party 
shipping companies. Those that provide crewing service directly to third-party shipping 
companies can be seen as occupying the second tier in the supply chain. A few big crewing 
agencies also subcontract some service to smaller crewing agencies who are on the bottom tier 
of the supply chain.  
 
Among the 37 companies participating in the study, apart from one shipping company that does 
not employ seafarers directly but outsources crewing service from agencies, the rest 36 
companies are engaged in crew management. For convenience, both in-house crew 
management arms and third party crewing agencies are referred to as crew management 
companies.  
 
It is common that crew management companies employ and differentiate between two groups 
of seafarers. The first group are commonly referred to as ‘company-owned’ seafarers. They are 
employed on medium-term contracts, and the contract length varies, ranging from 3 to 6 years. 
Upon the completion of the first contract, ‘company-owned’ seafarers can have open-ended 
contracts if they so choose. In a sense, this group of seafarers form the relatively stable pool of 
workforce. The second group can be regarded as temporary workforce, consisting of seafarers 
employed on tour-of-duty contracts. They are commonly known as self-employed or freelance 
seafarers in the spot labour market. The ratio between the two groups varies among these 
companies. While some companies outsource less than 10 percent of their workforce from the 
spot market or next tier agencies, one crewing agency ‘owns’ only 20 percent of their workforce 
on medium-term contracts.  
 
In general, crew management prefer to keep officer seafarers on medium-term contracts, while 
outsource ratings from next tier agencies or the spot labour market. According to the managers 
interviewed, this is because there is a shortage of officers and an oversupply of ratings in the 
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market. As bigger crewing agencies tend to outsource ratings, there are also subcontractor 
agencies specialized in providing ratings. One subcontractor participated in this study keeps 
only 20 percent of their workforce on medium-term contracts, while outsource the rest 80 
percent from the spot market.  
 
What are the differences between the ‘company-owned’ workforce and the temporary one from 
the perspective of companies? The main difference is costs. One cost that can be saved by 
outsourcing is leave pay. For ‘company-owned’ seafarers on medium-term contracts, the 
company needs to pay them ‘at service’ salary when they are working at sea, and leave pay 
when they are taking leave ashore. By contrast, if a company outsource crewing service from 
a third-party agency or the spot market, the company only needs to pay seafarers for the period 
working on ships.   
 
Another cost that can be saved is social insurance fees. According to the interviewed companies, 
they buy social insurance for all those ‘company-owned’ employees to fulfil the legal 
obligation under the LCL. If they outsource crewing service, they shift this legal obligation 
down the supply chain to the next tier crewing agencies or freelance seafarers. Again the next 
tier agencies only buy social insurance for their ‘company-owned’ pool of workforce. For 
freelance seafarers temporarily employed from the spot market, while some companies make 
it clear that they pay a social insurance subsidy into seafarers’ salaries, others do not but leave 
the social insurance matter to the seafarers themselves. In a sense, freelance seafarers tend to 
be treated as self-employed; and as they are employers of themselves, they are responsible for 
their own social insurance.   
 
In fact, social insurance, if paid in full and in proportion to income, is quite expensive. One 
company complained that social insurance was a heavy financial burden to them, up to 42.2 
percent of crewing costs, which meant that seafarers could only get 57.8 percent of what their 
employer paid into their accounts. Table 1 below is a breakdown of different types of social 
insurance that a typical state company employee would have. It shows that the employee would 
contribute 26 percent of his/her salary into social insurance, and that employer would 
contribute another 52 percent. In total, an employee’s social insurance is worth 78 percent of 
his/her salary.  
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Table 1: A typical example of social insurance that state companies buy for 
employees 
Social insurance type 
Employee contribution  
(as percentage of salary) 
Company contribution 
(as percentage of salary) 
Total 
Pension 8% 20% 28% 
Medical insurance 2% 14% 16% 
Unemployment insurance 1% 2% 3% 
Work injury insurance 0 0.8% 0.8% 
Maternity insurance 0 0.2% 0.2% 
Housing provident fund 15% 15% 30% 
Total 26% 52% 78% 
 
Therefore, if companies do not arrange social insurance for freelance seafarers, they would be 
more able to offer a higher salary. In fact, interviewees mentioned that freelance seafarers in 
spot market preferred that their temporary employers paid them higher salary instead of 
buying social insurance for them. Employers are happy to do that. As such, freelance 
seafarers in the spot market in general are not covered by social insurance, but their salaries 
are higher than others who are. 
 
There is another issue related to social insurance. Although all interviewed companies stated 
that they bought social insurance for ‘company-owned’ seafarers, they took different 
approaches to adjust the ratio between social insurance and seafarer salary. State owned big 
companies choose to buy full social insurance for their employees, but pay a lower salary. By 
contrast, other companies may choose to buy social insurance of the lowest possible standard 
and pay a higher salary to seafarers. Inevitably, complaint about the lower salary by seafarers 
at state owned big shipping companies is commonplace. According to these companies, they 
face the huge challenge of losing their workforce to other crewing companies and the spot 
market where seafarers enjoy a higher salary. They complained that they had become the 
seafarer training base for others – once they had trained seafarers up, these seafarers would 
want to leave for higher salaries.  
 
It is fair to say that social insurance serves to differentiate and segment the seafaring labour 
market in China. On one end, state owned companies provide more stable employment, full 
social insurance coverage, but lower salary. On the other, freelance seafarers are highly mobile 
and take precarious employment for higher salary with no social insurance.    
10 
 
 
Costs and benefits 
The above discussion suggests a tension between salary and social insurance. Salary is more 
visible because it is immediately available and can be used at present. As a contrast, the benefit 
of social insurance is less visible as it helps mitigate future risks and takes effect in future. For 
current or short-term gains, seafarers may choose higher salary with lower or no social 
insurance coverage. Although it is a legal obligation for companies to buy social insurance for 
their employees, they nevertheless cater for seafarers’ demand in order to attract sufficient 
workers.    
 
Wu, Lai, and Cheng’s (2006) data suggested that the number of freelance seafarers grew 
rapidly between 2000 and 2004, from 4,000 to more than 30,000. As seafarers were unsatisfied 
with the salary offered by state owned companies, once they had completed their first contracts 
many of them chose to leave these companies and become freelancers. Although no recent data 
about the number of freelance seafarers are available, it is reasonable to assume that a large 
proportion of seafarers are now freelance.   
 
High mobility carries risks, which is manifested more visibly when occupational injury or death 
occurs at sea. Even though maritime safety has been improving continuously (Allianz 2012), 
seafaring remains a relatively dangerous occupation (Hansen 1996; Roberts and Marlow 2005 
Borch et al. 2012). Therefore, occupational health and safety incidents on ships do happen from 
time to time, and happen more frequent than in other workplaces. In one participating crew 
management company which employed about 2,600 seafarers, about 10 cases of work related 
illness, injury, death occurred each year, and they tried to contain the accident rate below 0.5 
percent. According to the manager, their ‘company-owned’ seafarers were covered by ship 
owners’ P&I clubs, personal accident insurance bought by the crew management company, 
and social insurance; and by contrast, freelance seafarers were protected only by the first two 
and did not have social insurance. In this situation, if accidents occurred, the needs and 
expectations of victims in the first group and their families could be satisfied by compensation; 
but for freelance seafarers, it was be a different story and for a few times accidents had led to 
conflicts between seafarers and the crew management company. This problem also existed in 
other companies.  
 
To be sure, lack of social insurance can also lead to other problems which may not be concerns 
of management companies and therefore were not mentioned by managers during the 
interviews. For example, without pension, freelance seafarers may not have a stable income 
when they reach retirement. Furthermore, when they get sick while not working on ships, they 
are not covered by medical insurance.  
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This is not to suggest that despite the lower salary, state owned companies are better because 
they fulfill the obligations without discount regarding their employees’ social security. The 
point here is that LCL implementation is not problem free. Even though it is a legal requirement 
under the LCL that employers should arrange and contribute to social insurance of employees, 
in practice it is often avoided in relation to freelance seafarers. Lured by higher salary and 
immediate gains, seafarers take risks and disregard possible future consequences of not having 
social insurance. Employers take advantage of and cater for freelance seafarers’ risk behavior 
in order for successful recruitment from the spot market. In other words, no or low social 
insurance has become a competitive edge serving to attract the flow of seafarers. When 
accidents happen, however, treatment and compensation can become a headache for both 
employers and employees.      
 
Conclusion 
By its very nature, working at sea is an occupation associated with mobility. The globalization 
of the shipping industry has enabled the mobility of shipping capital. Partially due to this 
double mobility, the workforce at sea is increasingly and predominantly drawn from the 
developing regions, such as the Philippines, China, South Asia, and Eastern European countries. 
Accompanying this transformation is the rise of precarious employment. All forms of mobility 
have consequences for seafarers’ well-being.  
 
In this context, the MLC 2006 has been adopted and come into effect with the aim to protect 
seafarers’ rights and well-being. It regulates working and living conditions on ships, 
employment conditions, and welfare and social security. 
 
In China, the LCL, which has been in force since 2008, similarly requires employers to arrange 
and contribute to employees’ social insurance. The compliance however varies. State owned 
companies, for political reasons, may comply with regulation in full; but other companies may 
lower the standards or avoid it completely so that they are able to offer higher salaries to 
seafarers. In this way, social insurance may serve to segment the labour market and be used to 
create a competitive edge in recruitment. Lured by higher salary in the spot market, seafarers 
break away from medium-term or open contracts with former employers to become freelance 
and embrace employment mobility, resulting in a mobile workforce without social insurance.   
 
This article examines the issue based on managers’ accounts only. From seafarers’ perspective, 
there are perhaps more issues cropping up. Nevertheless, this does not blur the main issue here, 
that is, mobility may make LCL implementation problematic in China. This message may also 
be relevant to the implementation of MLC, because the global seafaring labour market is 
characterized by employment mobility. Crew management’s pursue for cost cutting and 
12 
 
seafarers’ pursue for immediate gains may make MLC implementation problematic especially 
in relation to social security.  
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